2014年1月14日 星期二

巴菲特的報告 The Security I Like Best

最近讀了巴菲特在1951年對GEICO所寫的報告,寫的很精準跟有重點,難怪他可以那麼成功,尤其他那時候才20多歲,可以用短短的一頁,寫出GEICO的投資吸引力,所以就研究了他所寫的架構,以後在看公司的時候,可以用這個架構去看。我想所有的投資人跟分析師都可以學習巴菲特研究公司的架構。

以下是我所分析出來的架構,以及我的解讀跟心得:
1. 產業是發生什麼事?市場對這些事件的反應是如何?為何有投資機會?為何會undervalued?
2. 產業的特性是什麼?產業好在哪裡?
價值要有大幅提升的空間,才是真正的undervalued,所以首要條件是產業有前景。
3. 公司是做什麼?主要顧客是誰?
巴菲特用一句話講完,表示真的知道這公司在做什麼,說的天花亂墜表示根本沒抓到重點。
4. 公司的Business model是什麼?
以GEICO來說,就是直銷。
5. 這樣的Business model帶來什麼樣的競爭優勢?
直銷不需要經紀人,所以跟同業比,GEICO的優勢低成本(這個巴菲特一在提到),也因此,GEICO可以提供低價產品給顧客。
6. 財務數字告訴我們什麼事情?
a. 保費跟保戶大幅成長,為什麼呢?因為低價吸引更多顧客。
b. 高margin,因為成本比對手低。
以財務數字來驗證公司競爭力,是非常重要的。
7. 跟競爭對手比較,公司的表現如何?
在經濟狀況不好時,其他對手都虧錢,GEICO還可以賺錢,且可以砍價吸引更多顧客,由此可知,這個產業比的是價格,是commodity,巴菲特後續也一直提到這一點。
8. 公司的前景是如何?有什麼成長來源?
巴菲特提到一個重點,The investor of today does not profit from yesterday's growth,所以一定要知道為什麼公司會有價值提升的機會。
9. 公司的資本運用狀況如何?價值會不會被diluted?
因為公司高成長,所以在投入比發股利好,進而提升更多內含價值。
10. 董事會的組成如何,持股狀況如何?管理階層如何?
11. 最後,簡單的一句話,為何公司undervalued?

這個分析架構,解答了許多研究公司該了解的問題,雖然只有短短的一頁,但巴菲特花了很多時間去了解產業跟GEICO,也因為夠了解,才知道重點在哪,才可以精準的寫出來。

不管是否可以到達巴菲特的地步,我想上面的分析架構,可以作為以後的參考跟準則。有興趣的人也可以看一下這篇文章,The Security I Like Best,或許會有不同的想法。

2013年8月21日 星期三

The Successful Use of Capital Can Bring Much More Value to Investors

一個讀後心得,商業周刊的報導:儒鴻,現在來看,儒鴻做的東西都是對的,但一開始有多少人注意到它,一開始洪鎮海花很多的錢去開發產品,賺來的錢都投入下去再研發,沒有做這些,也不會有後來的大量訂單以及穩定的客源,也不會有現在的高成長,高Margin,以及高報酬率。

In hindsight,儒鴻一開始做的事情,沒有辦法視為是好的business,花大量的資本去維持獲利成長,但現在來看,他做的事情卻是對的,因為這些花費建立起很高的barrier to entry,尤其是當他達到規模之後,其他的公司很難跟他硬拼。所以洪鎮海在2000年初所作的決策是很有前瞻性的。

身為一個價值型投資人,一開始也不會注意到這樣的公司,但過去十年,儒鴻替股東創造了很大的價值,也可以說它是價值投資,身為一個投資人,miss掉這樣的好公司,真的很可惜,也是一個錯誤,但從中可以有一些資本運用的想法。

固然ROIC可以代表一家公司的競爭力強弱,高ROIC代表這是一個Good Business,但單看絕對數字是會被誤導的,就如同COH或是宏達電一樣。相反的,低ROIC不代表公司未來就不好,一個新公司,通常都需要很大的資本投入,去維持它的成長,也通常會有較低的ROIC,但如果可以像儒鴻一樣,一開始的低ROIC轉換成高的ROIC,那就是真正的Good Business。

真正的重點,應該在於公司怎麼去運用它的資本,有的好公司投入的資本都很少,但有的好公司投資的資本很多,但賺的卻更多,所以看深一點,公司到底是盲目擴張,還是有目標有計畫的建立sustainable moats,後者是可以帶給投資人超乎想像的價值的,看到儒鴻是個例子,台積電也是個例子。

2013年8月13日 星期二

檢討錯誤-COH: A Company with A Declining Moat in A Competitive Industry

很久沒有update了,找到新工作,所以忙了一點,也偷懶一點,但看到有人回信給我,知道自己不能偷懶,也不能忘記初衷。

有很多新想法,但我想先檢討一下錯誤,檢討錯誤是很重要的,錯誤是寶藏,我也犯過很多錯誤,但唯有認真檢討才是打開寶藏的鑰匙,這邊引用一下Charlie Munger的名言:Tell me where I'm going to die, that is, so I don't go there.

現在要檢討的錯誤是我之前推薦過的COH,或許現在要說錯才太早,但我覺得應該八九不離十。COH曾經讓我賺很多,但後來因為2013Q2業績不如預期,股價大幅下滑,賺的幅度變小,儘管沒有虧錢,但我認為這也是一種錯誤,僅管買進價格夠低不至於虧錢,但在整個投資想法上出現了很大的瑕疵。

當初會買進COH是因為他過往的紀錄超級好,ROIC非常高,也有品牌能力,加上價值吸引人,所以在50元附近買進。經過一番的研究之後,了解COH所遇到的困境:美國市場因為KORS以及其他興起的業者,侵蝕掉COH的市佔率,雖然COH有很優秀的CEO,但無法改變這個頹勢。

過往的紀錄好,儘管表示公司有一定的競爭力,但如果公司的Moat是往下走,這就是個危險的投資,ROIC高表示產業很不錯,所以會有很多競爭者想要進入,這時候關鍵就在於公司的Moat是否sustainable。COH的問題在於公司在產業的浪頭上,而且又是平價奢侈風的領先者,所以ROIC高,但經過實地訪查以及果果的見解之後,發現COH的設計其實沒有獨特性,也沒有質感,久而久之消費者認清之後,就會轉向有質感的皮包,也就是說,儘管COH的ROIC高,但他卻無法產生消費者的忠誠度。其實這狀況跟宏達電一樣,兩家公司同樣都是在競爭激烈,進入門檻低的產業,而競爭力不夠穩固。

體認到這一點,要做的正確事情是要賣出公司,特別是當股價大漲的時候,而自己還是被自己的Bias所牽動,也就是:有部位就認為自己是對的,唯有保持客觀理性的態度,才不會受傷。

另外,要學會去分辨什麼是真正持久的競爭力,什麼是Surfer,Surfer不一定不好,好的Surfer可以賺很多,但要懂得何時下車,真正的原點還是在公司的競爭力。

Disclosure: COH賣掉囉

註:有興趣的可以去Download這個報告,

MEASURING THE MOAT


這個csinvesting是很棒的價值投資blog,裡面有很多豐富的資源,可以follow一下。

2013年4月25日 星期四

魔球2.0 - The Rays' Way

魔球算是過去二十年在美國大聯盟最流行的經營概念,不僅僅對棒球界,也對企業經營帶來新的想法,不過在過去八年,有一個新的概念興起,就是The Ray's Way,中文還沒有名稱,就暫時稱做為"光芒道",或是魔球2.0(不是野球太保那種)。

這個新概念,其實是由坦帕灣光芒隊所發展出來的,而這個啟源其實跟投資也有關係,因為這是由光芒的老闆與GM所推展,而這兩位人物,都是投資銀行出身的人,老闆Stuart Sternberg是高盛的合夥人,而GM是Andrew Friedman,做私募基金出身的。

金融業出身的人當大聯盟球隊的老闆不是頭一回發生,像紅襪的老闆John Henry是避險基金經理人,David Einhorn是紐約大都會的少數股東。而光芒隊之所以會這麼紅,是因為光芒隊創造了跟運動家隊同樣的魔球奇蹟。

熟悉美國大聯盟的球迷都知道運動家的魔球,就是以統計數據客服小市場球隊財力不足的難題,透過計量分析來創造球隊的長期競爭力,而運動家的魔球也推動了sabermetrics的興起。而光芒隊所做的其實也差不多,球團也運用了計量分析,不但如此,還有一個新概念,就是The Extra 2%的概念,他們認為,勝負基本上是50-50的機率,但如果你可以找方法多個2%,長期來說,你的結果就大大不同,其實這個觀念也跟價值投資的觀念差不多。

有興趣的人,可以去看The Extra 2%這本書(剛好台北市圖書館又有),這是一本非常棒的書,有些價值投資人也推薦看這本書。內容介紹光芒隊在新管理階層接手後,在薪資有限的情況下,如何從一支萬年爛隊,變成過去五年平均勝場數91.6場的強隊。方式跟運動家隊差不多,就是依靠選秀,培養年輕球員,簽別的球隊所忽略的球員,以及利用新老闆在投資銀行的方法做球隊的交易。而除了提到提升球隊競爭力之外,還有提到如何讓球迷回到球場的過程。

而在最近運動畫刊,就有光芒隊的專題報導,裡面也有Extra 2%的觀念,例如一般觀念都認為第一個好球數要搶到,但光芒隊卻是以2好1壞來作為球數領先的條件,在去年他們在2好1壞出現的比例是大聯盟第一。

另外,還有介紹光芒隊培訓投手的方法,特別是他們培養投手的系統跟制度;熟悉棒球的人都知道,投手是棒球運動最重要的一環,在我過去看大聯盟的歷史,過去20多年只有多倫多藍鳥隊1992-93是靠打擊奪冠的,其它冠軍球隊的投手陣容都是當年度數一數二,不管是牛棚或是先發。

光芒隊的老闆體悟到這一點,但礙於球團Budget有限,無法簽下超級投手,所以他們就想辦法去培養自己的投手,最重要的是,他們在培養年輕投手不躁進。有些球隊為了戰績考量,常會把年輕有潛力的投手提前推上大聯盟,因而造成這些投手提早受傷,或是還不夠成熟,無法如預期的達到該有的潛力。但光芒隊不一樣,對於年輕投手,一進去先強化身體,手臂以及肩膀,並規定年輕投手一年只打一的層級,什麼球種不能投,像所有年輕投手一開始都不准投cutter,而投球局數跟投球數都逐步增加。

這樣做的目的,主要有兩個,一個是耐用度高,報導指出,在大聯盟要得到冠軍的一個指標,是隊中有四名投手上場先發30場以上,過去五的球季只有15支球隊達成過,其中12支球隊進季後賽,而過去五年的世界大賽冠軍,都有四名投手先發30場以上,而光芒隊也是其中一隊;其次是即戰力,光芒隊的投手不但耐用,且年輕,而且成熟度高,看一下他們去年先發投手的情況就知道。

Age W ERA GS IP H SO WHIP SO/9 SO/BB
James Shields 30 15 3.52 33 227.2 208 223 1.168 8.8 3.84
David Price 26 20 2.56 31 211 173 205 1.1 8.7 3.47
Matt Moore 23 11 3.81 31 177.1 158 175 1.348 8.9 2.16
Jeremy Hellickson 25 10 3.1 31 177 163 124 1.254 6.3 2.1
Alex Cobb 24 11 4.03 23 136.1 130 106 1.247 7 2.65

我覺得光芒隊的成功,主要在於他們的觀念正確,管理階層知道自己沒有錢留下或簽下明星球員,能靠的就是年輕球員,所以他們最核心的理念,就是一定要培養一群年輕投手,可以不斷的補充投手的流失,而且這些年輕投手一上大聯盟,就一定要是即戰力,這種觀念造就了他們過去五年的成功。

光芒隊的成功,不是偶然,而是他們管理階層願意接受事實,但不是跟事實妥協,而是找方法取得競爭優勢,不斷的改善過程,專注於過程的完美,成功就是這樣來的。





2013年4月21日 星期日

張忠謀反指標效應

上一篇關於台股短期的看法,看起來是蠻幸運的,短線上台股真如預期反彈,可惜上禮拜五自己的操作出的太早,少賺了許多,但投資本來就是這樣,調適好心情就好,而且也只是短線的看法,最終還是要回歸趨勢。

禮拜五台股的強勢,主要是拜台積電所賜,難得一件的台積電漲停板,似乎為台股帶來一絲陽光,但背後卻可能烏雲罩頂,原因也是台積電,而且是我們的半導體教父。

如果有在follow張忠謀的人,大概會知道他所說的景氣方向,會跟股市是反方向,也就是反指標,而在東森57台之前也有談論過這個情況,我也觀察個幾次,的確是有這個狀況,但為了印證,這邊就想蒐集個資料庫,來作為比較正確的判讀,也可以拿來印證。

先說這次的結論,4/18那天,張忠謀說:最好的一年來臨,這是看多的觀點,以過去幾次的經驗,股市會有一個下跌的波段,所以,手中有部位的,應該要找時間點賣出了。接下來就看一下過去的記錄,這記錄可能不完全,時間也有限,未來會再陸續蒐集。
就過去四年的例子來看,張忠謀的言論對股市而言,等於是很有效的反指標,看多三次,三次中有兩次是往下,一次等於持平,而看空六次,股市只有一次往下走,其他都是往上,很有效。

不過還是要注意,資料數不多,還需要再補充多一點,所以未來會有新的update,這樣可以對張忠謀講的話做比較正確的判讀。但就目前來看,因為張忠謀而在禮拜五跳進去的人要小心,以他在上禮拜四的言論,我會選擇站在賣方。

當然這種指標不是只有張忠謀這樣,這邊也不是要貶低張忠謀,我非常尊敬張忠謀,他對台灣的貢獻絕對很多,沒有台積電,我想台股會更爛,而沒有人預測景氣是準的,郭台銘也有同樣狀況,去年七月Bill Gross說股市已死,結果美股創歷史新高,所以預測都是以不準居多,這次我們也可以看看張忠謀效應是否存在。










2013年4月10日 星期三

Coach (COH): A great business which you should look into

I am not a fashionable guy and never follow luxury brands. But I know Coach is an affordable brand. So when Coach's stock is suffering, it arose my attention.

Summary:
Coach (COH) is a fashion-goods company with a long history. In the past decade, COH increased its EPS 31% per year thanks to its presence in Asia. Even with this high growth rate, COH employed little capital and continues to return excess capital to shareholders. Its management is respectful and leads to the success in Asia. The company has suffered from economic headwinds in 2012 and emerging threat from Michael Kors, another fashion-goods company which offers the same products as Coach. Economy is improving this year and Michael Kors is not a threat which Coach is unable to handle. At current price, Mr. Market is thinking moderate to low growth for Coach and ignoring its expansion in Asia. 6% earnings yield and increasing payout will offer good return to shareholders.

Investment Rationale:
I think many people are familiar with Coach so I won't take too much space to talk its history and business. In a nutshell, Coach is an well-established brand. It has a long history, founded in 1941, and clearly a leader in handbags and fine accessories. Handbag is its major product, accounting for 65% of its net sales. But right now, it is transforming itself into a lifestyle brand, not just a handbag brand, by broadening its product offering into outerwear, shoes, jewelry, watches, eye wear, and fragrance. 

Coach is aggressively expanding into international markets. Coach is famous in Asia. Its international business grew from 9% of net sales in FY 2000 to 31% in FY 2012, a CAGR of 32.7%. Even in Japan, a country of lost decade, Coach is able to grow 32.7%. Coach is expanding fast in China, where its store number increases to 96 in FY 2012 from 5 in FY 2005. All these meet its strategic initiative, aggressively growing international business. Coach carries out a multichannel strategy, including retail stores, factory stores, wholesalers and internet. 89% of its net sales is from retail and factory stores.

Due to its international expansion, annual revenue growth over the past 10 years is around 20.8%. CAGR in the past five years is 12.8%, slowing but still quite high number considering the period includes the Great Recession. Thanks to China, Coach was able to make a small gain in 2009. 

Usually, high-growth companies require lots of capital and sacrifice their margin to fuel their growth. Coach's operating margin indeed is declining, from an pre-crisis average of 36.7% to an post-crisis average of 31.3%. But Coach requires little incremental capital. Its employed capital only increases by 18% in the past five years while its earnings is up by 56.5%. Its CAPEX need is low so Coach can retain a lot of cash flow. What Coach has earned has become its free cash flow. And Coach distributed these huge cash flow to its shareholders. 


Net Income FCF DVD Repurchase Total Payout
2002 85.8 51.9 0.0 9.8 9.8
2003 146.6 164.5 0.0 49.9 49.9
2004 261.7 381.0 0.0 55.0 55.0
2005 388.7 221.3 0.0 265.0 265.0
2006 494.3 462.9 0.0 600.3 600.3
2007 663.7 638.4 0.0 150.0 150.0
2008 783.1 748.7 0.0 1,336.6 1,336.6
2009 623.4 568.9 0.0 453.8 453.8
2010 734.9 908.6 94.3 1,150.0 1,244.3
2011 880.8 885.6 178.1 1,098.0 1,276.1
2012 1,038.9 984.2 260.3 700.0 960.3
Total 6,101.9 6,016.0 532.7 5,868.4 6,401.1

In addition, Coach can turn over its cash very quickly. Though Coach's turnover of inventory is long, it essentially receives cash much faster than it pays. Furthermore, its turnover of inventory is getting faster.  Thus, with high margin, returning cash to shareholders and efficient asset turnover, Coach has been enjoyed high return on capital employed. Its ROCE is average 41% in the past 10 years and ROE is also 40% as Coach has a negligible amount of debt. 

Receivable days Inventory days Payable days Cash conversion cycle
2002 13.1 209.5 34.8 187.8
2003 12.7 208.2 38.9 182.0
2004 12.6 193.6 45.2 161.0
2005 12.9 184.5 58.5 138.9
2006 12.9 187.2 64.8 135.3
2007 13.4 188.3 67.9 133.8
2008 12.3 172.7 66.2 118.8
2009 12.2 156.2 55.3 113.1
2010 11.0 148.5 44.9 114.6
2011 11.1 141.9 40.5 112.4
2012 12.2 145.2 43.0 114.4

All these indicate that Coach has a moat and is a typical company favored by Warren Buffett, requiring little capital to grow its business. Its moat comes from its branding power, which attracts loyal customers. 

In addition to strong business, Coach has a stable and competitive management team. Its CEO, Lew Frankfort, is a veteran. He joined Coach in 1979 and was named Chairman and CEO in 1995. So Coach's international success is pretty much directed by Lew Frankfort. He was recognized as one of the 30 most respected CEO globally by Barron's from 2005-2008, and 2012.  Reed Krakoff is Coach's executive creative officer, an important position in a fashion company. He has served as the role since 1996 and worked for several design houses.

However, the stability of management may face challenge next year as Lew Frankfort will step down as CEO. He will remain the post of executive chairman. Fortunately, a seven-year veteran in Coach, Victor Luis, will become the next CEO. I believe that the company's strategy will not change dramatically under Luis as he is credited for international expansion for the past seven years. He led the success plan in Asian markets.  Nonetheless, the transition of CEO is still a risk to be taken into account.

With competitive business, strong brand and credible and stable leadership, Coach is definitely a great company. But the stock price has been declining since 1Q 2012, which may offer a good price for a great company. However, I still have to see what has happened in Coach and whether the problems are structural or temporary.

Its top-line growth reached peak in Q1 CY2012, and since then dropped from double digits to single digit in Q4 CY2012 at only 3.8%. 3.8% is the worst number since the Great Recession. The downtrend is primarily due to its declining comp. store sales growth in North America. In the latest quarter, Coach recorded a negative SSS growth of -2.2%. The sliding sales led to the anemic earnings growth, 4.2% and 5.4% in previous two quarters, respectively.

In the latest earnings call, the company blamed the disappointment for the macro headwind caused by fiscal cliff and Hurricane Sandy, and intensified competition in women's handbag. Is the company's reasoning justified?

Historically, fashionable companies can somehow defy economic headwind as they have brand power. Consumers interested in luxury goods are also more affluent. Comparing Coach's peer performance can tell us whether Coach is especially weak last year.  The selected peers are based on COH's proxy statement.

Comparable store sales YoY%


Apparently, COH's peers had been through some slowdown in the fourth quarter. A few companies recorded positive same store sales, like GPS, LTD. AEO and ANF saw sharp slowdown. But for high-end luxury brands, like TIF and GES, SSS was negative.  

However, we have seen an upstart, Michael Kors. And there's no secret that Michael Kors is seen as the biggest threat to Coach. Both companies offer nearly the same products. Prices are also alike. And right now, Michael Kors is gaining Coach's market. Women are talking about Michael Kors is selling the hottest handbags and Coach is losing its design edge.

Michael Kors is definitely the threat to Coach. But is it the threat that Coach can not deal with? I don't think so. Even if in North America, Coach is losing its customers to Michael Kors. I think this is normal for a emerging player in the market. And don't forget that Coach has also been hot before. With branding power, Coach has some customer base. Furthermore, Coach has a much higher brand awareness and footage in Asia. Coach is an established brand in Asia while Michael Kors is still in the early stage. Coach is still growing in emerging markets, where people's purchasing power is expected to grow further.

When I start to study COH, it traded at around 13x TTM EPS and 11.5x Fwd EPS. On 4/10, COH jumped 2.57% to 51.21, a fairly-valued price. This price is not depressed price. But you pay a fair price for a company with established brand, competitive management, friendly-to-shareholders policy, and expanding emerging-market business. This is not a bad deal and lower price will make me more excited to buy.

Disclosure: I am holding the long position of COH and will buy more if the price goes lower.






2013年4月8日 星期一

北韓與禽流感入侵台灣?

昨天台股重挫,雖然說是因為補跌,但補跌的跌幅似乎多了一點,感覺像是北韓進攻台灣,還有大陸禽流感傳到台灣,不過實際上如果真是如此,應該是每天都無量跌停。

但實際上,我實在是不懂為何台股要如此恐慌?而冷靜一點想,現在的下跌反而是短線做多的機會,或許禽流感是個不確定性,兩韓戰爭其實對股市是利多,怎麼說呢?

簡單說,就打與不打的問題,如果兩韓開打,以歷史經驗,凡是戰爭開打,股市往後都是往上居多,所以開打對股市是利多,如果不打,不用講,一定是利多。

而回歸到會不會打的問題,基本上,我是覺得不會打,因為北韓的既定模式就是這樣,吵一吵之後就沒事了,而畢竟新官上任三把火,為了鞏固政權,北韓新領袖想要大吵一下也是可想而知,但除非他是真的失心瘋,要不然真的打了,對他也只是兩敗俱傷,自己的政權也會沒有,看看伊拉克的例子就知道了,所以如果他老爸有提醒過他的話,他應該知道該放手的時候就要放手,但他是不是比他老爸還瘋狂,這就很難說了。

所以台股跌成這樣,實在是過度恐慌,沒有道理可言,不管怎樣都是利多,就算開打了,重創南韓經濟,而將南韓是為貿易與企業競爭對手的台灣,也是利多,怕被飛彈射到,看看日本比台灣更接近韓國,跌幅也沒那麼慘,所以,台股這樣慘,投資人應該趁機會去撿便宜,也可以買一下韓國的ETF。

不過這也不是說台股就一路長紅,只是屬於短線的看法,也順便紀錄一下,未來回頭再來檢討看對不對。